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Appellants Utah State Bar and Stephen Hutchinson
(hereinafter collectively referred to as the "Bar") will
respond herein to certain of the arguments raised by
Respondent and Cross-Appellant Brian M. Barnard ("Barnard") in
his Brief.
I.
A.

ARGUMENT ON BAR'S APPEAL

The Bar is Not a State Agency.

The principal ground upon which Barnard argues that the
Bar is a state agency and thus subject to the provisions of
the Archives and Records, Services and Information Practices
Act, Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 63-2-59, et seq. (the "Records
Act") and the Public and Private Writings Act, Utah Code
Annotated, Sec. 78-26-1, et seq. (the "Writings Act") is that
all of the powers granted to the Bar "come either from the
state Legislature or from the state Judiciary."
Brief, p. 12]

[Barnard's

The fact that the Bar was created by and its powers are
derived from the Legislature or Supreme Court has little, if
anything, to do with whether the Bar is a state agency.

For

example, the Legislature authorized the creation of
corporations.

A corporation has only such powers as are

provided by statute.
and 16-10-4.
state.

See, Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 16-10-3

That doesn't make corporations agencies of the

Barnard's argument was rejected in Utah Technology

Finance Corp. v. Wilkinson, 723 P.2d 406 (Utah 1986),
discussed in the Bar's initial Brief.

This Court determined

that the Utah Technology Finance Corporation was not a state
agency even though it was created by the Legislature, was
funded with tax funds and was subject to strict regulation and
control by the state.
Barnard further argues that the Bar is a state agency
because it has the power to regulate the legal profession
through the admission and discipline of lawyers.
of Barnard's argument is twofold.

The fallacy

First, the Bar can only

make recommendations to the Supreme Court concerning the
admission and discipline of attorneys.

More importantly, the

mere fact that the Supreme Court has delegated to the Bar
certain responsibilities with respect to the admission and
discipline of attorneys and that the Bar, in fulfilling those
responsibilities, acts as an arm or agent of the Court doesn't
mean that the Bar is thereby transformed into a state agency
for all purposes.

There is a big difference between being a
2

particular purposes

r-r example, sometimes smaller

. jur'-^s

contract w i t h rr:v jt * ••'"-<- +• pprr^rr v *,f-rr".^ep* ij iunctic:;s,
such as T

-i r .

>

:

-. *- : nq ~-^s =i *4overrrerital

those functions, t h - private 'irir. agent, nu* *ridL dot---*'*- "

• >--j- * -

agency a; , thus sul .. :

i

'"^•-' '

give

*

T

-.» •

• . m x=> '. : vrrnrer.n

.iec.ij.

The nar demonstrated

.-"t- and .

-

.« -

•

: .

;r

KJL t-::
if,
t J

-

i nc r , c e 01. •,.., .i i r-. c e t o r e ! i i j i u * . . --• . *A :-"U . \ -.ride; U t a h

C o d e A n n o t a t e d , S e e s , - v- • • -- ". a n d ;; 3- • o~ 1.a

T

:.» its .:.:: ?. -: .*-: * - :•

•'

j

'., ^

a s s e r t innot i ^

;• -

Ai^r.out

because

H

M'rxr/.y

-i s e p a r a t e

that

\

.vh : /n H a r v a r d

- L

... . -- - •;: r e q u i r e d t o a i v e

-« J«=P <-• *• •

-v^t^d"

R ;.
devoid o; r^rit.
in arv v

Section £;-.-88

* * ;t- Records nc"

:- :

• 'JIT^IL to du away wiUi tiie notice of claims

requirements.
The Bar is obviously a \ m i q u e entity,
n o t 1 i a v e t h e a 1 1 r :i b i 11 e s ::> f a s t a t e a g e i I c y

H o w e v e r , it. does
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Barnard suggests that if t h e Bar's p o s i t i o n is
simply that t h e Bar is n o t a State agency for all
p u r p o s e s , b u t for some purposes that t h e Bar must
concede that some disclosure is required regarding
some functions of t h e Bar. This is not t h e Bar's
p o s i t i o n . T h e Bar concedes that it acts as an arm
or agent of the Supreme Court for some p u r p o s e s .
It does not concede that this fact m a k e s t h e Bar
a state agency.
3

the Bar's initial Brief, the Bar has more of the attributes of
a professional association.

It owns its own property, it pays

property taxes, it elects its own commissioners and is
governed by its own by-laws.

It performs a number of

functions which have nothing to do with the admission or
discipline of attorneys or any governmental function.

These

attributes are totally inconsistent with any notion that the
Bar is a State agency.

The Bar is therefore not subject to

the Records Act or Writings Act.
B.

The Records Act Does Not Apply to the Judiciary.

Barnard fails to respond to the Bar's argument in its
initial Brief that the Records Act only applies to the
executive branch of state government and, therefore, is
inapplicable to the Bar which is an arm of the Supreme Court.
Thus, Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 63-2-68.1(4), requires the
State Records Committee (comprised solely of executive branch
personnel) to make available classification review upon the
request of the legislative or judicial branches of state
government.

Similarly, Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 63-2-79,

requires the archivist (an executive branch employee) to
assist and advise the legislative and judicial branches and
provide them program services upon their request.

In fact,

the executive director of administrative services has
promulgated administrative rules to implement the Records Act.
Utah Administrative Code, Archives Rule R3-1-1, et seq.

4

Rule

R 3 - 2 ] s p e ::: i f I c a I ] y p r o v i d e s 11 i a t !::: 1 I e i : i i ] = a j: }:: • ] i • s s t :> ,' a 1 1
state agencies", bi it goes or I to provide that:
This rule and related Archives procedures ar e
not mandatory for the Legislative and Judicial
branches of state government except as provided by
law.
Those branches may adopt or not adopt this
rule and related, procedures or parts thereof as
they desire.
Clearly the administrator charged with implementing the
Records Act doesn't believe iu v. r ies tu tne judicial or
legislati ve branches of governme:.
entitled to considerable weight.

^hat determination is
Bayle v. Bd. of Review of

Indus. Corn".i I. |: 700 P 2d ] ] 35 (I Jtah 1 985) ; Wells Fargo Armoi , :,
Service v. Public Service, 6 2 6 P.2d 450 (Utah 1981) ,
C.

The Statutes Cannot Be Constitutionally Applied to

the Bar.
Barnard does not really face up the issue of whether the
Records Act and Writings Act can be constitutional^ applied
t
rtv

;>Iy basij asserted by Barnard in support of his

position uiat dpr : * --r * ! * :,+ itute ; u n d e r r e v i e w t o t h e Bard o e s n o t <-^nst i t,.i - . .i^.^r
provision.

: t h e >'zdh

>r\ : t h e s e p a r a t i o n o f p o w e r s

"\;i^t • .:ti',: is t h a t t h e " j u d i c i a r y i s ,

2

Initially, Barnard argues that this Court should
disregard the constitutionality argument on the
. basis that it was not raised below or in. the Bar's
Statement of Issues Presented fox Review. Barnard
previously
filed
a
Motion
to
strike
the
constitutionality argument from the Bar's Brief on
the same basis.
This Court decided it would
consider the constitutionality argument and deni ed
the Motion.
5

in many instances, controlled by statutes."
p. 28-29]

[Barnard Brief,

Barnard then proceeds to cite Legislative

enactments which are not even analogous to the statutes
involved in the present case.
Barnard absolutely ignores the fact that Article V,
Section 1 of the Utah Constitution prohibits the Legislative
or Executive branches of government from exercising any power
properly belonging to the judiciary and that under Article
VIII, Section 4 of the Utah Constitution, the Supreme Court is
given the sole power to govern the practice of law.

Thus, the

Utah Supreme Court has the sole power to regulate the Bar and
its members.

See, In the Matter of Washington State Bar

Association, 548 P.2d 310 (Wash. 1976); Ex Parte Auditor of
Public Accounts, 609 S.W.2d 682 (Ken. 1980).

It is up to this

court to determine what records of the Bar, if any, shall be
made public and to specify the conditions and procedures under
which the records should be made public.
In this regard, Barnard concedes that the courts should
"have discretion to seal Court documents."
30]

[Barnard Brief, p.

Barnard contends, without any authority, that there is a

big difference between court documents and records of
employees1 salaries.

However,

neither the Records Act nor

the Writings Act make any such distinction.

If those statutes

apply to the judiciary, they purport to deny the judiciary the
discretion to seal court documents.

The Writings Act

expressly includes as a public writing "judicial records".
6

Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 78-26-1(2).

The Writings Act then

goes on to provide that "except as otherwise expressly
provided by statute" each citizen has the right to inspect and
make copies of public writings.
In short, the Bar is an arm of the Supreme Court.

The

Supreme Court has the sole power and authority to govern and
regulate the Bar.

The Supreme Court does not share that power

with the Legislature.

It is not for the Legislature to

dictate to the Supreme Court what records of the Bar shall be
made public, or to prescribe the manner in which that
determination is made.
II.
A.

ARGUMENT ON BARNARDfS CROSS-APPEAL

Barnard is Not Entitled to Exemplary Damages.

Barnard argues that the trial court erred in determining
that the Bar's alleged violation of the Records Act was not
willful and in refusing to award exemplary damages.

This

argument is simply wrong even if it is assumed the Bar
violated the Records Act.
In the first place, the statute upon which Barnard
relies for an award of exemplary damages is not applicable.
Sec. 63-2-88(2), Utah Code Annotated provides:
Any responsible authority who willfully violates
any provision of this Act shall, in addition to
those remedies provided under Subsection (1), be
liable for exemplary damages of not less than $100
nor more than $1,000 for each violation.
[Emphasis added]

7

The term "responsible authority", in turn, is defined by Utah
Code Annotated, Sec. 63-2-61(8) as:
. . . Any state office or state official
established by law or executive order as the body
responsible for the collection, use or supervision
of any set of data on individuals or summary data.
[Emphasis added]
The exemplary damage statute is not applicable either to the
Utah State Bar or to Stephen Hutchinson because neither has
been "established by law or executive order as the body
responsible for the collection, use or supervision" of the
data which Barnard seeks.
Second, the trial court acted well within its discretion
in determining that any violation was in good faith.

In this

regard, it was Barnard's burden to show the violation was
willful.

To the contrary, it was clear that any violation was

in the good faith belief that the Bar was not required to
disclose the information.

In fact, the Bar actually did

disclose salary ranges to Barnard.
B.

Barnard is Not Entitled to an Award of Attorneys1

Fees.
Barnard erroneously argues that the trial court erred as
a matter of law in refusing to award Barnard attorneys1 fees.
Barnard argues that under Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 63-288(1), attorneys1 fees are mandated.

However, in quoting that

statute, Barnard omits the crucial language which makes it
clear that attorneys1 fees can only be awarded in an action
against the state.

Thus, Section 63-2-88(1) reads, in full:
8

Any responsible authority who violates any
provision of this act shall be liable to any
person, suffering damage as a result thereof, and
the person damaged may bring an action against the
state to recover any damages sustained, plus costs
incurred and reasonable attorney fees. [Emphasis
added]
Barnard did not commence this action against "the state".
Further, even if the statute were to be interpreted as
authorizing attorneys1 fees against a "responsible authority",
neither the Utah State Bar nor Stephen Hutchinson fall within
that term as previously demonstrated.
Barnard also argues that the trial court erred because
it did not enter any findings of fact explaining the court's
reasons for not awarding attorneys' fees.
26]

This argument is frivolous.

[Barnard Brief, p.

Findings of fact are not

required with respect to Summary Judgment motions.

Utah Rules

of Civil Procedure, Rule 52(a); Stewart v. United States, 716
F.2d 755 (10th Cir. 1982) cert, den. 105 S.Ct. 432.
Consequently, there is simply no basis upon which to
award Barnard attorneys' fees.
C.

Barnard is Not Entitled to Have the Fifth

Affirmative Defense in the Answer Stricken.
Incredibly, Barnard asks this Court for an Order
striking the Bar's Fifth Affirmative Defense in its Answer on
the basis that the defense constitutes a violation of Rule 11
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, is "an improper and
insufficient defense" and contains impertinent and scandalous
matter.

Aside from the fact that Barnard never presented any
9

evidence in the court below which would support his
contentions other than the evidence from which the court
determined that the statutes had been violated, the issue of
striking the affirmative defense is simply not before the
Court.

Barnard cross-appealed from the Summary Judgment

entered by the District Court to the extent that the Summary
Judgment refused to award exemplary damages and attorneys1
fees. [Barnard Brief, Ex. C]

The Summary Judgment made no

determination concerning striking the defense nor did
Barnard's Motion For Summary Judgment even request that the
affirmative defense be stricken. [Barnard Brief, Ex. A ] 3
Further, in Barnard's statement of issues on the cross-appeal,
the only issues raised were the exemplary damages and
attorneys' fees issues.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it respectfully submitted
that the Summary Judgment in favor of Barnard should be
reversed and the case remanded with instructions to enter
Judgment in favor of the Bar.

3

Barnard had requested, in a Motion to Dismiss, that
the affirmative defense be stricken. No ruling was
ever made on that Motion and it is not before the
Court.
10
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